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Introduction 
For those who are unfamiliar with the term, ‘mansplaining’ refers to a moment when a 
man takes it upon himself to educate others with a "delightful mixture of privilege and ignorance 
that leads to condescending, inaccurate explanations, delivered with the rock-solid conviction of 
rightness and that slimy certainty that of course he is right, because he is the man in [the] 
conversation."1  Since its introduction to the English language in the early 21st century, 
mansplaining has generally been used in reference to women’s rights and feminism’s struggle 
with cultural misogyny.  However, the term serves as an excellent metaphor to describe the 
situation that occurred in the focus of this essay – a radio symposium about science and religion.  
The men who spoke in the symposium were regarded as experts in their fields mostly due to their 
privilege, class, race, and gender – none of which they earned and none of which qualified them 
to talk about the subject.  Rather than men explaining women – as is the case with mansplaining 
– this symposium shows white Christians explaining non-white non-Christians.  This ‘white-
splaining’ or ‘Christian-splaining’ resulted in a prejudiced, ignorant worldview which was spread 
throughout the Western world.  This symposium is one of many similar bricks that built the 
foundation of racist and oversimplified conceptions of world religion in the generalized Western 
consciousness today. 
Western consciousness can be influenced by many varying factors, including mass 
media.  Radio technology significantly impacts public consciousness because it is a ubiquitous 
but generally unnoticed source of information.  People do not usually stop to think about the 
amount of social data they intake by just going about their lives.  Radio was a developing 
technology in the early 20th century, and its social implications had not yet been fully realized.  
                                               
1 Karen Healey. “A woman’s born to weep and fret,” Live Journal, 8 May 2009  
 2 
Before the invention of the internet and television, radio was the only form of mass media.  
Information broadcast through the radio had a much more crucial impact than previous 
communication technologies such as newspapers.  This impact is one of the characteristics that 
enable it to be considered a religious technology.  The information shared through the radio 
affected the worldviews of the tens of thousands of people living in Britain at the time.  Radio is 
both a product of the culture and simultaneously a magnifying glass for certain aspects of the 
culture. The ability of radio broadcast information to be spread so widely so instantaneously 
meant that the magnifying glass quality was very powerful indeed.  Hence, the opinions 
expressed in the science and religion symposium did reflect the cultural norms of the time, but 
they also enhanced particular sentiments and ensured their continued presence in Western 
culture.  Namely, they propagated the social theory of cultural Darwinism.2 
When most people think of Darwinism and religion, they think of the modern creation 
versus evolution debate.  They think of religion and Darwinism as opposing, mutually exclusive 
concepts working at cross purposes.  However, in the early 20th century, scientists, philosophers, 
and men working in a religious profession came together to use Darwinism as a tool to explain 
(fallaciously) their perspectives. These cultural Darwinists misappropriated Charles Darwin’s 
theory of evolution in an effort to comprehend their place in a rapidly changing world.  Many 
factors affected how their sense of cultural identity changed in the 20th century.  Colonialism and 
the Enlightenment desire to emulate Grecian values created a pressure to separate the Christian 
‘West’ from the racially profiled Semitic traditions of Judaism and Islam.  Following the 
example of philologists (language scholars), comparative religion ‘scientists’ (otherwise known 
                                               
2 Social theories and colloquial theories should not be confused with scientific theories.  Scientific theories 
(like evolution and gravity) are ways to describe the natural world that scientists are essentially convinced 
of their truth.  The only reason they are called the Theory of Gravity and not the Fact of Gravity is 
because upstanding scientists are aware of the fact that nothing can ever be positively proven – there is 
always room for bias, error, and new information provided through new technologies or new hypotheses. 
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as cultural Darwinists) forged an existential outlook based off their invented racist 
categorizations of world religion. 
The symposium, Science & Religion, that was broadcast over the BBC in 1930 
exemplifies the problematic assumptions made by religion scholars and ‘scientists’ of 
comparative religion at the time.  This symposium was a series of twelve talks by prominent 
scientists and clergymen.  These talks serve as a snapshot of the movement to advance the 
science of comparative religions.  The men speaking in this symposium reveal hierarchical 
paradigms that value certain religions over others seemingly on the basis of race.  They 
mistakenly appropriate Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution and apply it to human cultures to 
rationalize this biased point of view.  As a remarkable social tool, broadcast radio enabled this 
racist message to be disseminated among the masses in such a way that its reverberations remain 
deeply embedded in Western culture today. 
From September to December of 1930, this series of talks was broadcast throughout 
Great Britain.3  Its stated purpose was to give a 
 
personal interpretation of the relation of science to religion by speakers eminent 
such as churchmen, as scientists, and as philosophers; and to determine, in the 
light of their varied and extensive knowledge, to what degree the conclusions of 
modern science affect religious dogma and the fundamental tenets of Christian 
belief.4 
 
The foreword by Michael Pupin provides some clues about the nature of the content of this 
symposium.  First, the information presented in this symposium is clearly only relevant to 
                                               
3 Professor Julian Huxley; Professor Sir J. Arthur Thomson; Professor J.S. Haldane; the Right Rev. E.W. 
Barnes, Bishop of Birmingham; Professor B. Malinowski; the Very Rev. H.R.L. Sheppard, Dean of 
Canterbury; the Rev. Canon B.H. Streeter; Professor Sir Arthur S. Eddington; Professor S. Alexander; the 
Very Rev. W.R. Inge, Dean of St. Paul’s; Dr. L.P. Jacks. Science & Religion: A Symposium. (New York, 
C.: Scribner’s Sons, 1931), “Note” 
4 Ibid., “Note” 
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Western culture because each speaker is a well-to-do, white Englishman who has conceivably 
limited his study of science and religion to Western modes of thought.  In fact, although the 
symposium claims to be on the subject of science and religion, it is readily apparent that it is 
only concerned with Western, post-Enlightenment science and Western religious systems 
(Protestantism, in particular).  The professed purpose of this series of talks is to prove that 
science and religion share a common goal, that  
 
one cannot fail to recognize that Science and Religion are the offsprings of the 
same fundamental belief that there is an eternal truth which is intelligible, and that 
the longing is deeply planted in the soul of man to search for morsels of this truth 
in every nook and corner of the physical as well as the spiritual universe.  Without 
this longing the life of man would lose most of its meaning; it would certainly 
lose the knowledge of its Creator.5, 6 
 
In other words, the men whose thoughts are immortalized in this symposium represent the desire 
to find ultimate truth.  This search is ultimately their downfall as they presume that their truth 
must inherently be truer and thus more important than the truths of others.  This basic 
supposition drives the fallacious reasoning prominent in the symposium.  We could oversimplify 
here and say that truth is the root of all evil in this series of talks. 
The conjecture of singular, superior truth can be deconstructed to help us understand how 
cultural Darwinism functioned.  First, the symposium speakers surmised that the truths belonging 
to science are different truths than the ones belonging to religion.  Second, they assumed that 
religions could be categorized as true or false.  In order to remain focused in spite of the wealth 
of fascinating material available in the symposium, only ideas about religion and science related 
                                               
5 Ibid., p. xi 
6 The use of the generic masculine is a common foible among pre-21st century scholars, but it is always 
worth noting that the use of the generic masculine to describe the entire human species is incredibly 
problematic and reminiscent of the historical and continued oppression of those who identify as female or 
non-binary in Western society. 
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to cultural Darwinism will be presented.  This arrangement of their talks is not intended to give 
the idea that all twelve men agreed with each other about the nature of the relationship between 
science and religion or even which methodologies should be used to examine them.  However, 
this style allows a glimpse into their cultural Darwinian tendencies without getting side-tracked 
by issues of equal importance, if not relevance, to the focus of this paper.   
 
Setting the Scene: Britain, 1930s 
The 1930s were a time of great social, political, and economic change.  This decade is 
usually characterized by massive unemployment due to the Great Depression – the economic 
crisis that occurred after the infamous Wall Street crash in 1929 which sent shock waves through 
a society drunk on the rewards of the early 20th century Industrial Revolution.7  Despite the 
crisis, emerging technologies and enterprises such as automobiles, aircraft, and electronics kept 
parts of Great Britain afloat until the industry boom created by World War II in 1939.8  
Counterintuitively, perhaps, while the unemployment rate fluctuated from dreadful (22.8% in 
1933) to mildly alarming (13.9% in 1936), the poverty rate actually declined during this time 
(10% in 1930 to 4% in 1936).9  A new style called Art Deco appeared (term coined and 
henceforth retroactively applied at the Exposition Internationale des Arts Decoratifs in Paris, 
1952), filling buildings with furniture and architecture replete with “geometric shapes instead of 
the flowing lines” associated with Art Nouveau, the previous style du jour.10   
                                               
7 Tim Lambert. “Everyday Life in Britain in the 1930s,” Local Histories, accessed April 4, 2017  
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
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The monarch at the time was King George V (reign 1910-1936).11  In response to the 
Great Depression, he convinced the disparate factions of British government to unite into a 
coalition force that could deal with the economic crisis.12  1931 saw the Statute of Westminster 
introduce noteworthy change to the British empire: after the conclusion of World War I, Ireland, 
Canada, Australia, India (to some extent), New Zealand, and South Africa demanded the “right 
to self-governance.”13  Unlike his predecessors, George V sought to “embody those qualities 
which the nation saw as their greatest strengths: diligence, dignity and duty. The monarchy 
transformed from an institution of constitutional legality to the bulwark of traditional values and 
customs (particularly those concerning the family).”14  His reign altered the personality of the 
British monarchy to  mirror “the values and virtues of the upper middle class rather than the 
aristocracy.”15  Although the early 20th century was a time of political and economic upheaval, 
his dedication and commitment, his “good relationships with the Labour Party and unions,” and 
his humility allowed him to moderate tension and move the British Commonwealth beyond its 
contemporary struggles.16 
In 1924 and from 1929 to 1935, Ramsay MacDonald was Prime Minister of Great 
Britain.17  He was a left-wing politician who became unpopular after criticizing the British 
government for amorally engaging in the war with Germany.18  He is credited with being the first 
prime minister from the new Labour Party, and his leadership oversaw the recognition of the 
                                               
11 “George V (1910-1936),” Britannia, accessed April 6, 2017  
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Biography.com Editors. “George V Biography,” TheBiography.com, (A&E Television Networks), 
accessed 6 April 2017 
16 Ibid. 
17 Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Ramsay MacDonald: Prime Minister of the United Kingdom,” 
Encyclopaedia Britannica,” updated 29 July 2016  
18 Ibid. 
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Soviet regime and the Geneva Protocol approved by the League of Nations.19  In 1931, 
MacDonald resigned as prime minister (as a member of the Labour Party) – due to his professed 
lack of understanding of the economic crisis – only to take on the role of prime minister again for 
the new coalition government; unsurprisingly, this move made him less than popular with his old 
Labour Party colleagues.20 
To summarize: in 1930, Britain was dealing with the economic turmoil of the Great 
Depression, the global political change effected by World War I and demands for national 
autonomy, and the rise of new technologies inspired by the Industrial Revolution.  These factors 
affected British identity and forced the British to re-evaluate their position in the world. 
 
Broadcast Radio Culture 
 One of the emerging technologies of the 1930s was broadcast radio.21  Although the first 
radio technology was created by Nikolai Tesla in 1893, the official patent for the modern radio in 
use today belongs to Guglielmo Marconi, to whom it was awarded by the British Government in 
1986.22  In 1904, the Wireless Telegraphy Act declared that “all wireless transmitters and 
receivers must be licensed by the Post Office”; this Telegraphy Act would play a crucial role in 
creating the BBC down the line.23  Initially, the radio was used to transmit messages in Morse 
code to naval ships that were out at sea, which meant that radio use surged during World War I.24  
                                               
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 For a full history and analysis of broadcast radio, see: Hugh Chignell. Public issue radio: talks, news 
and current affairs in the twentieth century (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 
22 Logan Wyman. “The History of Communication Technology: Radio,” Pennsylvania State University, 
April 2008  
23 Paddy Scannell, David Cardiff. A Social History of British Broadcasting: Volume One 1922-1939, 
(Oxford, Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1991), p. 5 
24 Wyman 
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Two “key features” of the British broadcasting system that worked in tandem to allow 
radio to generate massive social influence were the license fee and the monopoly.25  Logistically, 
the license fee introduced by the 1904 Wireless Telegraphy Act granted the Post Office the 
“power to define the terms and conditions upon which licenses were granted.”26  These licenses 
permitted broadcasters to legally use the radio waves to broadcast their programming to the 
public; each broadcasting entity had to pay this fee in order to produce programming.  The Post 
Office was, at the time, the “state’s major revenue-producing department,” and it sought to 
further increase its revenue by exploiting the license fee.27  The monopoly was established with 
the creation of the BBC: the British Broadcasting Company (later changed to the British 
Broadcasting Corporation) came into existence in 1922.28  After only a few months of 
broadcasting, a special committee was convened to address the confusion and concerns of the 
people “who feared the radio would seriously affect their health” and the popular press “which 
believed that a radio news service would harm its circulation.”29  This 1923 Sykes Committee 
decided that broadcasting should be regarded as a distinctly “public utility” and should therefore 
be treated with caution.30  They stated,  
 
The ‘wavebands available in any country must be regarded as a valuable form of 
public property; and the right to use them for any purpose should be given after 
full and careful consideration...the control of such a potential power over public 
opinion and the life of the nation ought to remain with the state.’ The operation of 
so important a national service ought not to be allowed to become an unrestricted 
commercial monopoly.31  
 
                                               
25 Scannell, p. 5 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Wyman 
29 Scannell, p. 6 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
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Notice, the Sykes Committee was concerned about the possibility of a commercial monopoly, 
but they had no such reservations about creating a monopoly handled by the government.  
Despite their assertion that authority should “remain with the state,” they did not advocate for 
“direct government control.”32  Rather, they insisted that 
 
indirect control should be operated through the license which by law must be 
obtained from the Post office for the establishment of any broadcasting station.  
The terms of the license, laid down by the Post Office, would specify the general 
responsibilities of the broadcasters and hold them answerable for the conduct of 
the service to the state department.33 
 
Therefore, the state did not directly dictate the content of BBC programming, but it loomed over 
production nevertheless like a strict parent.  The first Director General of the British 
Broadcasting Corporation, John Reith, made it his business from 1923 to 1938 to ensure the 
“development of a programme service guided by considerations of national service and the 
public interest.”34  If the public and popular press had not been interested in the social 
implications of the broadcasting monopoly, the Sykes Committee may have never been 
convened.  Without the conclusions reached by this committee, British Broadcasting may not 
have become the public service behemoth that it remains to this day. 
 In the early 20th century, radio technology was an almost magical, unfamiliar 
communication tool.  Following its use as a military tool, integrating the radio into the daily life 
of British citizens was not an easy task; it took some time before it was “accepted culturally.”35  
Radio represented a “different” and “mysterious” chasm of possibility that entranced the 
                                               
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., p. 6-7 
35 Paul Rixon. “Radio and popular journalism in Britain: Early radio critics and radio criticism,” The Radio 
Journal – International Studies in Broadcast & Audio Media, Vol. 13, No. 1 & 2, 2015, Doi: 
10.1386/rjao.13.1-2.23_1   
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public.36  Indeed, even as the radio transmitted the news, it was itself newsworthy in much the 
same way that hoverboards and virtual reality technology amaze and attract the attention of 
people today.37  Interest in this technology centered on “the quality of reception, the mystery of 
radio, its social impact and the...the wonder of hearing something live through a small box many 
miles from where it was happening.”38  The nearly instantaneous connection unaffected by time 
and space must have been as unfathomable in 1930 as quantum weirdness is incomprehensible in 
2017.39 
Unmoved by this fascination, Director General Reith remained open to the practical 
possibilities made available by this new technology.  He was adamant that broadcast radio  
 
must not be used for entertainment purposes alone…[It] had a responsibility to 
bring into the greatest possible number of homes in the fullest degree all that was 
best in every department of human knowledge...Broadcasting should give a lead 
to public taste rather than pander to it…[This service] had an educative role and 
the broadcasters had developed contacts with the great educational movements 
and institutions of the day in order to develop the use of the medium of radio to 
foster the spread of knowledge.40 
 
In Reith’s words, it is evident that this public service should have an aspect of the cultural, the 
moral, and the educational.  Additionally, “as [he] was well aware, [radio] had a social and 
political function too.”41  This national broadcasting service presented the opportunity to unify 
disparate classes of the population as never before.42  Reith cites the speech given by George V 
for the opening of the British Empire Exhibition; radio’s ability to relay national ceremonies and 
                                               
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Yes, ‘quantum weirdness’ is a technical term.  See John C. Caiazza. The Disunity of American Culture: 
Science, Religion, Technology, and the Secular State. (New Brunswick, London: Transaction Publishers, 
2013) Chapter 8: Atoms in the Cultural Void: Steven Weinberg’s Material Dreams 
40 Scannell, p. 7 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
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functions live “had the effect, as he put it, of ‘making the nation as one man.’”43  Even more than 
unification, radio had the “immense potential for helping in the creation of an informed and 
enlightened democracy” by enabling citizens to “take an interest in many things from which they 
had previously been excluded” due to their class or race.44  Radio had the flexibility to present on 
any significant social issue “both the facts of the matter and the arguments for and against.”45  
Reith envisioned “a new and mighty weight of public opinion” strengthened by a citizenry with 
an informed mind of its own rather than one who was forced by circumstance “to accept ‘the 
dictated and partial versions of others.’”46  In his imagination, the “concept of public 
service...had, as a core element, an ideal of broadcasting’s role in the formation of a reasoned 
public opinion as an essential part of the political process in a mass democratic society.”47  It was 
exactly this sort of motivating idealism that led to the production of programmes such as the 
symposium on Science & Religion in 1930. 
 
Broadcast Radio as a Religious Technology 
Broadcast radio functions as a religious technology in its role as a mass communication 
device.  According to theorist Jeremy Stolow, technologies are “pragmatic and productive forms 
of mediation between human subjects and their environments.”48  This definition by no means 
fully encompasses the many disparate conceptual theories of technology, but it will help 
elucidate how broadcast radio worked as a religious technology.  Similarly, defining religion is 
                                               
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., p. 7-8 
47 Ibid., p. 8 
48 Jeremy Stolow. “Technology: religion versus technology, religion and technology, religion as 
technology,” in Key Words in Religion, Media, and Culture, edited by David Morgan, (New York, London: 
Routledge, 2008), p. 188 
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not an objectively feasible task.  Theories on religion range from understanding the world 
according to a dichotomy or a harmony of the sacred and the profane to viewing religion, to a 
system that oppresses its adherents, or to a system that orders existence in a rationally 
comprehensible fashion.  For this essay, religion will be considered that which organizes human 
existence in a way that interacts with cultural notions of the sacred.  A religious technology 
therefore is one which mediates human experience with those aspects of their environment 
related to their understanding of the sacred.  Stolow elaborates, 
 
Rather than searching for an inferior experience or feeling of divine presence, of 
the numinous, or the sacred that can somehow be shorn of all outward trappings, 
we are more amply rewarded by examining the myriad ways in which religious 
experiences are materialized, rendered tangible and palpable, communicated 
publicly, recorded, and reproduced – in short, mediated – in and through its given 
range of technological manifestations and techniques.49 
  
Technology, when considered in this way, becomes the medium through which religion is 
practiced, shared, and discussed.  Without technology, it could be argued that religion would not 
be able to operate.50  Technology allows humanity to access the sacred through written word, 
instruments, methods of breathing, and other techniques germane to each unique religious 
practice.51  Because of this mediation, technology “shape[s] human experience by actively 
participating in – and thereby transforming – networks of action” in human communities.52  
Therefore, technologies can be religious in nature, and religion is inherently technological. 
 Broadcast radio is one of those religious technologies because it functioned within the 
society of early 20th century Britain to mediate the human experience of the sacred.  Broadcast 
radio connected thousands of people to a central source of information that influenced how they 
                                               
49 Ibid., p. 195 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid., p. 194-195 
52 Ibid., p. 195 
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conceptualized their lives, as noted by Reith above.  One “unique” feature of broadcasting that 
differentiated it from other communication technologies like newsprint is that it comes to people 
in their homes and often seems to have a kind of “disembodied authority.”53  The technology of 
broadcasting granted an “enormous importance to the spoken word.”54  Furthermore, in the 1930 
symposium, the widespread dissemination of specifically religious ideologies highlight radio’s 
ability to mediate between impressions of the sacred and the humans tuning-in to the radio 
programme. 
 It is important that this symposium was spread through the medium of broadcast radio 
because its special status as a dominant influence in the daily lives of radio listeners.  This power 
meant that the ideologies expressed in the symposium both reflected the culture and in turn 
changed it.  One person commented, “The growth of broadcasting…has been like a 
revolution.”55  Another explained, “At home everybody…is played upon by a constant stream of 
sounds bringing entertainment and news, events as they happen, music, politics and teaching.”56  
Broadcast radio was a universal medium of which everyone could partake – even the young, the 
old, the blind, or the infirm.57  The universal and inclusive nature of broadcast radio allowed the 
messages of the symposium to be absorbed by the entire British population without 
discrimination.58  Moreover, the BBC’s professional commitment to manage “controversy” in 
potentially politically charged issues (like the intersection of science and religion, for example) 
allowed the symposium speakers “the greatest possible freedom of speech” while simultaneously 
halting the “tiresome charges of political bias”.59  This freedom which allowed the speakers to 
                                               
53 Mary Crozier. Broadcasting: sound and television (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 2 
54 Ibid., p. 1 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., p. 2 
58 Pun intended. 
59 Chignell, p. 19 
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express themselves truthfully without outwardly appearing to be too prejudiced was a factor in 
creating trust between listeners and the BBC.  This trust in the message of the media magnified 
the ubiquitous power of broadcast radio. 
 The downside of this great influence was that the views being communicated by radio 
were generally more radical than average.  The men (and very few women) who spoke “were 
undoubtedly extremely famous celebrities of their day, [but] also held dangerously radical 
views.”60  Some Marxist critical theorists argue that “journalism’s function is essentially one of 
social reproduction, in the service not of society as a whole, but of its dominant groups and 
classes.”61  These radical views were simply new ways of envisaging a worldview framed by 
patriarchal, Western hegemonic power dynamics.  This view of media – “as a ‘consciousness 
industry’ propagating a ‘one-dimensional’, ‘affirmative’ culture” is one often shared “not only 
among Marxists, but feminists and others concerned with the sociology of culture.”62  Despite its 
apparent popularity and rationality, this theory should not be considered the end-all-be-all 
explanation for why British society embraced and propagated the message shared by the 
symposium speakers.  As always in the academic world, more scholarship exists and also is yet 
to be discovered in the areas of radio culture, the psychology of radio, and its impact on 
contemporary events and ideologies. 
 
Original Darwinism 
The idea that phylogenies could be used to organize the religions of the world was one 
that helped spark the science of comparative religions.  Before the appropriation of Darwinism 
and its application to world religions can be examined, some basic knowledge is required 
                                               
60 Ibid., p. 28 
61 Brian McNair. News and journalism in the UK (London, New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 24 
62 Ibid., p. 26 
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regarding biological phylogenies – the original phylogenies – and Darwin’s theory of 
evolution.63  In the 1820s, Darwin embarked on a five-year expedition to gain extensive data and 
knowledge in the field of zoology, the study of animals.64  From this experience came the 
“germinal ideas” for his theory.65  In 1859, his treatise titled The Origin of Species was 
published.66  In brief, his theory of natural selection is that “favorable variations would tend to be 
preserved, and unfavorable ones to be destroyed.  The result of this would be the formation of 
new species.”67  What this means is that all things being equal, traits that better enable animals to 
survive would be passed onto future generations of animals because the parent animals survived 
long enough to reproduce.  Conversely, animals that had traits that did not lend themselves to 
survival would most likely not survive long enough to pass on such unfavorable traits.   
Science novices may ask, “What are these ‘traits’, and where do they come from?”  
During the process of gene replication that takes place in the cells of living organisms, mistakes 
sometimes occur.  These mistakes are called mutations.  While the term ‘mutation’ may carry a 
negative connotation in colloquial English language, it has no such weight within the biological 
community.  A mutation has neutral value; it has the capacity to be either a benefit or a burden to 
the organism.  When a mutation is a benefit, it increases the likelihood that its host organism will 
survive, which in turn increases the likelihood that the mutation will be passed along to further 
generations of that particular organism.  When a mutation is a burden, it may either kill the 
                                               
63 Alfred Russel Wallace was another British naturalist who concurrently developed a theory of evolution.  
In the biological community, it is more accurate to discuss Darwin and Wallace’s theory of evolution, 
rather than merely referencing Darwin.  In fact, if not for Wallace’s catalytic actions, Darwin may never 
have actually published his research.  However, for the sake of concision and clarity, only Darwin will be 
discussed here.  Wallace, as he so often must, will have to excuse the author for her neglect.  See the 
“Introductory Note” from The Origin of Species, edited by Charles W. Eliot for more details on Wallace’s 
pivotal role. 
64 Charles Darwin.  The Origin of Species, edited by Charles W. Eliot, (New York: P. F. Collier & Son, 
1909), p. 5 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., p. 6 
67 Ibid., p. 7 
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organism outright (as is often the cause of miscarried or stillborn babies) or merely decrease the 
likelihood that the organism will survive long enough to reproduce, which in turn decreases the 
chances that the burdensome mutation will appear in future generations.  Over the millennia, 
populations of organisms become distinguishable from one another through their possession 
(genotype) and expression (phenotype) of certain mutated genes.  Darwin termed this process 
“natural selection.”68 
Observation of physical traits (phenotype), experimentation to determine genetic 
information (genotype), and more recently, the technology of gene sequencing, have allowed 
scientists interested in evolution to create a sort of road-map tracing the origin of these mutated 
genes.  These road-maps are called phylogenies and can be used to illustrate how various species 
are related to one another.  See Figure A for an example of such a phylogeny. 
 
 
Figure A. This phylogeny shows the relationship between mammals, birds, reptiles, fish, insects, bacteria, 
and fungi using the genetic mutation of nucleotide substitutions for a particular protein, in this case the 
protein cytochrome c.69 
                                               
68 Ibid., p. 23 
69 “Phylogeny based on nucleotide differences,” accessed 1 May 2017  
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The more mutated genes two species have in common, the more likely it is that they are more 
closely related.  Despite centuries of naturalists’ observations of animal life, each phylogeny is 
only an educated guess.  No self-respecting scientist would claim that their phylogeny represents 
the absolute truth of evolution.  Firstly, the only way to verify the accuracy of a phylogeny 
would be to become a god, travel back in time, and watch the progression of life on Earth from 
the very beginning until the present.  Secondly, good science requires a consciousness that 
subjective predisposition can never be truly erased from even the most prudent of experiments.  
With the same data, two dissimilar scientists will create two dissimilar phylogenies that reflect 
their individual and cultural biases.   
 
Cultural Darwinism 
 The so-called science of comparative religions emerged in response to a crisis of 
modernity, specifically the demand for a solid European identity, created by globalization in the 
wake of the Enlightenment.  Enlightenment attitudes about knowledge and truth shaped how 
scholars approached the practice of comparative religion.  The science of comparative religion 
looks at “phenomena of human thought and conduct…tracing the history of their developments 
and corruptions, and classifying them according to their observed relations.”70  The science of 
comparative religion attempts to borrow the principle of observation from the scientific method 
in order to examine human cultures and categorize them according to their apparent differences.  
This practice began in 19th century Europe.71  For a long time, the people of Europe had “a well-
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established convention for categorizing the peoples of the world into four parts, rather unequal in 
size and uneven in specificity, namely, Christians, Jews, Mohammedans [sic] (as Muslims were 
commonly called then), and the rest.”72  This type of categorization seemed to work fine in the 
rather small world of the Middle Ages, but following the Enlightenment, it was no longer 
adequate.  With the advent of the inductive reasoning method championed by the Enlightenment, 
“those branches of science which deal with the merely phenomenal aspect of things [had] 
undergone an enormous development.”73  As Enlightenment rationality became the order of the 
day, certain principles at the foundation of Western religious tradition were questioned.  For 
instance, people wondered 
 
whether monotheism – the doctrine of one universal god – should continue to be 
assumed as the basis of universality…it was no longer the absolute authority of 
some irascible creator-judge deity ruling in the desert, but rather something more 
mellifluously philosophical and abstract, that genuinely embodied the principle of 
unity and universality.74 
 
Questioning these assumptions signaled a cultural shift from a society dominated by the church 
to one ruled by inquisitive thought, ingenuity, and a turning away from blithely accepting 
religious doctrine at face value. 
Colonialism played an influential role in the creation of comparative religious studies.  A 
perceived need to separate Christianity from other religious traditions came as part of a general 
movement to more sharply define European identity in the face of the modernity crisis of 
globalization.  Modernity refers both to the time period following the Enlightenment as well as to 
a “consciousness of cultural change” that affected how people conceptualized their place in the 
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world.75  Despite Europe’s apparently dominant position in the colonial world, “in this novel state 
of global connectedness, the West suddenly found itself to be not so much in masterly control as 
perilously vulnerable, as it found its own state of well-being inexorably dependent on unseen and 
unknown realities as remote as a village halfway across the planet.”76  Religion theorist and 
champion of comparative religion Mircea Eliade captures this existential crisis of modernity in his 
discussion of what he calls “the grave crisis brought on by the discovery of the historicity of man 
[sic].”77 Historicism is Eliade’s theory that “history reveals itself to be a new dimension of the 
presence of God in the world.”78  He explains that the entirety of human history therefore should 
be regarded as a theophany – a manifestation of God; “everything that happened in history had to 
happen as it did, because the universal spirit so willed it.”79  He proposes, 
 
This new dimension, the historicity, is susceptible of many interpretations.  But it 
must be admitted that from a certain point of view the understanding of man as 
first and foremost a historical being implies a profound humiliation for the 
Western consciousness.  Western man considered himself successively God’s 
creature and the possessor of a unique Revelation, the master of the world, the 
author of the only universally valid culture, the creator of the only real and useful 
science, and so on.  Now he discovered himself on the same level with every other 
man, that is to say, conditioned by the unconscious as well as by history 
[emphasis added] - no longer the unique creator of a high culture, no longer the 
master of the world, and culturally menaced by extinction.80   
 
With this uncomfortable realization, the need for strength and solidarity was imminent.  Changing 
the intellectual categorization of the Christian religion was “part of a much broader, fundamental 
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transformation of European identity.”81  This transformation resulted in a rebranding of Europe as 
‘the West.’  We can examine “scholarly works of some prominent nineteenth-century savants and 
intellectuals [to see how they] exemplified the way Europeans reimagined themselves as ‘the 
West’ and reconceptualized their relation to the rest.”82  Colonialism was a noteworthy part of this 
globalization, and European identity rebranding must be understood within its context.  When we 
consult the scholastic literature of the 19th and early 20th century, a disconcerted mood indicates 
“that the whole world [was] undergoing a profound transformation unlike any other in history.  At 
the same time, it also implied that an adequate appreciation and comprehension of this 
transformation [was] possible only from a widely panoramic, indeed imperially global, 
perspective.”83  In due course, it became apparent that the to fit within this imperially global 
perspective, any “discourse on religion(s)” must “be viewed as an essential component, that is, as 
a vital operating system within the colonial discourse.”84  The scholars responsible for the study 
of comparative religions wanted to  
 
acquire, and acquire quickly, a sweeping knowledge of the multiplicity of 
religions in the world because a new techno-geopolitics was unfolding 
dramatically before one’s eyes, and it was vitally necessary to come to terms with 
this strangely brave new world, indeed with a brand new sense of the world itself.  
The new vision of the world was a necessary consequence of violent globalization 
in the form of colonialism.85 
 
Hence, the pluralistic theory of world religions fulfilled a need to understand what which was 
previously incomprehensible.  Pluralism functioned to “distinguish the West from the rest.”86  
For Western society, “[w]hat gave particular urgency to this new perception of the increasingly 
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global reality was that the news coming from afar was on balance not very good; certainly by the 
1930s there was a growing sense of an impending, or perhaps already unfolding catastrophe.”87  
To combat this fear borne of finding themselves in a much larger world than had been imagined 
in previous centuries, Europeans needed a way to conceptualize their position in the world in 
relation to everybody else.  The study of comparative religion produced “endless speculation on 
the differences and similarities between religions continually provided opportunities for modern 
Europeans to work out the issue of their own identity and to establish various perceptions of the 
relation between the legacy of Christianity on the one hand and modernity and rationality on the 
other.”88  Comparative religion was the answer to the fear and uncertainty of 19th and early 20th 
century globalization.   
 The identity that Europe wished to encapsulate was that of a hegemonic power in their 
growing – or shrinking, depending on the point of view – world.  The study of comparative 
religion “facilitated the conversation of the Eurohegemonic claim from one context to another – 
that is, from the older discourse of Christian supremacy (now considered bankrupt by many 
liberal Christians) to the new discourse of world religions, couched in the language of pluralism 
and diversity.”89  In other words, European scholars wanted to make the same argument that they 
had been making for centuries – that Europe was inherently superior to other cultures – but found 
that in their newly globalized world, they had to approach the conversation from a less blatantly 
antagonistic standpoint.  The narrative that was written to embody this newly created Western 
identity was  
 
concocted largely on the basis of the unwarranted assumption of European 
hegemony, that is, on the basis of a monolithic universalist notion of history as a 
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singular civilizing process, of which modern Europe was the triumphant vanguard 
and all other civilizations and non-European societies merely markers of various 
interim phases already surpassed by the people of European descent.90 
 
The supposition that humanity possesses only a single path to civilization presupposes the idea 
that certain modes of being are intrinsically better than others.  Not only that, but it presumes to 
make such a bold statement without any recognition of the bias that necessarily exists in such a 
claim.  Another unsupported expectation of comparative religion used to support European 
hegemony was the notion that “Christianity was fundamentally different from all other religions, 
thus...beyond compare.”91  This, once again, flawed presumption about the “singularity of 
Christianity 
 
was often expressed in a vaguely oxymoronic phrase: ‘uniquely universal.’  In the 
opinion of the theological comparativists, Christianity alone was truly 
transhistorical and transnational in its import, hence universally valid and viable 
at any place anytime, whereas all other religions were particular, bound and 
shaped by geographical, ethnic, and other local contingencies.92  
 
This assumption of uniqueness in the Christian tradition was the key to concurrently 
consolidating European identity while maintaining cultural ties with the church that did not 
threaten Europe’s scientific progress.  
These Enlightenment attitudes were heavily shaped by a desire to emulate the lauded 
Ancient Greek society.  The Greeks, in the European imagination, epitomized the rationality and 
values associated with an ‘advanced’ civilization.  In fact, “most of the prized institutions of the 
modern West (science, art, rationality, democracy, etc.) were of Greek origin; this rendered 
religion (Christianity) a conspicuous anomaly amid the Hellenic pedigree of the European 
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heritage.”93  This desire to model “the West” – a relatively new identifier – after the scientific 
rationality and “imagined glory” of the Greeks really became a cultural obsession.94  
Unfortunately, this aspiration to align Western society with Grecian values and tradition had a lot 
to do with the racist wish to distance themselves ethnically from the Abrahamic religions of 
Judaism and Islam.95   
 
After all, was it not reason – that faculty fully realized for the first time, 
purportedly, by the Greeks – that allowed the ancients to discern the true unity of 
myriad phenomena amid the multiplicity and diversity of a marvelously prolific 
nature?  And, as some of the nineteenth-century hellenizing enthusiasts went on to 
suggest, was it not this discernment that became the foundation of science, the 
best system of governance, and art – in effect, the bona fide universals of the 
True, the Good, and the Beautiful?  In contrast, monotheism, which was 
increasingly portrayed as a Semitic tendency, came to represent exclusivity 
(rejection of multiplicity) rather than universality (orderly embrace of 
multitudinous totality).96, 97  
 
In the association of monotheism with the ethnographic label ‘Semitic’, we begin to see the 
connection of race to religion in addition to a need to portray Christianity as something more than 
just a regional or national tradition.  The Greek propensity for discovering universality among the 
phenomena of human experience is a motivating factor for the science of comparative religions, 
which tries to uncover intrinsic links connecting the behaviors of various cultures. 
 Semitic cultures were cast as the opposite of everything the Greeks symbolized.  From the 
beginning, the “modern discourse on religion and religions was...a discourse of secularization,” 
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meaning that it wished to distance itself from the disciplines of theology and metaphysics; 
however, it was simultaneously an obvious “discourse of othering.”98  Othering is the social 
tendency to fear that which is separate and different from oneself.  In this case, the ‘science’ of 
comparative religions was used to justify an anti-Semitic prejudice predicated upon a historical 
tradition of othering.  Essentially, “this scientifically based anti-Semitism facilitated a new 
expression of Europe’s age-old animosity toward the Islamic powers, insofar as this science 
categorized Jews and Arabs as being ‘of the same stock,’ conjointly epitomizing the character of 
the Semitic ‘race.’”99  The seemingly arbitrary classification of Jews and Arabs as being the same 
race betrays a drastically incorrect yet nonetheless common supposition.  This classification 
suggests that ‘Arab’ is synonymous with ‘Muslim,’ which is not the case, as hundreds of millions 
of Muslims live in Indonesia, Pakistan, India, and Africa.  Using the term ‘Arab’ to describe all 
Muslims shows the racialized thought patterns that were used to other specifically Semitic people.  
Understanding this “devaluation of the Semitic” allows us to “begin to understand the new logic 
and renewed momentum behind the particularly harsh condemnation of Islam” that has existed in 
Europe since the 8th century conquest of the Iberian peninsula by Muslims.100  In the science of 
comparative religions, “the zealously monotheistic, materially poor, mentally rigid, and socially 
illiberal desert Arab – already frequently described by nineteenth-century writers as ‘fanatic’ – 
has come to stand as the quintessential Muslim.”101  It becomes plain that due to this conflation of 
Judaism and Islam with ‘fanatic’ monotheism, the discourse of secularization was necessarily one 
of othering.  To be driven by religion was to not be driven by science and reason in the minds of 
comparativists.  Determined to chart a course of pure rationality, Western scholars therefore 
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carried with them an extreme bias based upon racism when they examined and categorized the 
religions of the world.  In order to separate Christianity racially and theologically from Judaism 
and Islam, Christianity was given the quality of universality, meaning that it could transcend time 
and space; if Christianity was not bound by the geographic and temporal limits of its historical 
context, then it could be considered fundamentally unlike traditions that were bound by those 
limits.  This convenient – and to modern eyes, so unambiguously racialized and problematic – 
ideology arose from the “the scholastically untenable assumption that all religions are everywhere 
the same in essence, divergent and particular only in their ethnic, national, or racial 
expressions.”102  In the words of European intellectual history and critical theory professor 
Tomoko Masuzawa, “This system [of comparing religions] has been closely associated with, and 
given its justification by, a racialized notion of ethnic difference.”103  Cultural Darwinism cannot 
be comprehended without acknowledging the racist subtexts which it embodied. 
 The leap from original Darwinism to cultural Darwinism was not direct.  In fact, the 
practice of appropriating Darwinism had a critical layover in linguistics.  Philology, or the study 
of language as it exists in historical sources, was the first pseudo-science to make use of Darwin’s 
theory of evolution.  In the globalized world of the 19th and early 20th centuries, scholars gained 
access to historical texts that had been previously unknown and unavailable to Western academia.  
For example, the Sanskrit texts of the Vedic tradition in India were of particular interest.  
Philologists compared the languages found in ancient manuscripts all over the world and created 
phylogenies to show their estimates of the relationships between the languages – both living and 
dead.  Rather than tracking genetic mutations or observable phenotypic traits like naturalists (the 
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original Darwinians), philologists used common root words with distinct endings as well as 
voiced inflection changes to mark out the relationships between languages. 
 
 
Figure B. This phylogeny illustrates the relationships between languages of the world belonging to the 
classification “Indo-European.”104 
 
One of the reasons that comparative religion has such racist undertones is that philology 
propagated this understanding with its conclusions.   They identified a linguistic ‘tribe’, 
 
the Semitic languages, includ[ing] Arabic and Hebrew, which were well known to 
Europeans because they were the language of the Qur’an and the Old Testament 
respectively.  The great majority of nineteenth-century philologists maintained 
that…[this] tribe of languages was decidedly imperfect and inchoate in 
inflectional capability, and with this imperfection came all the limitations that 
characterized their native speakers as a race.105 
 
This blatantly racist justification for categorization and use of language to justify racism carried 
over into cultural Darwinism.  Notice that the phylogeny above conveniently shows an 
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evolutionary relationship between Greek and English, and yet the Semitic languages are not even 
depicted.  The philologists passed on the idea that this practice of appropriating Darwinism was 
an academically sound practice, which it was not.  While the “parallels between organic and 
linguistic evolution are indeed pronounced,” the two processes are influenced by vastly different 
factors.106  Organic evolution – Darwin’s original theory – is subject to natural selection while 
linguistic evolution is not.107  The “deep grammatical properties” of language are “constrained by 
a system of parameters” that has no effect upon natural evolution.108  Nevertheless, philology 
was taken to be a legitimate science by the European scholarly community. 
 Inspired by the ‘science’ of philology, cultural anthropologists took Darwin’s theory and 
applied it to human cultures. They created phylogenies of religion that were incredibly 
prejudiced (see Figure C.)  These phylogenies were used to rationalize patronizing views of 
‘primitive’ and ‘savage’ religions.  They were wrong to do so both logically and ethically.  The 
Darwinian phylogenies do not conclude that any one species is more advanced than any other.  
Cultural Darwinism, on the other hand, propagated the idea of European hegemony.  It suggested 
that world religions matured from primitive to advanced, and they presumed that Christianity 
was naturally the most superior of these religious traditions.  They categorized religions by the 
size of the society in which they occurred: 
 
If the society in question was small and ‘tribal’ in its scale and lacked the 
technology of writing, it would be an object of study for anthropology.  If on the 
other hand, the society happened to be a large-scale, regionally dominant 
kingdom or empire and had a long and illustrious written tradition, it would fall 
under the aegis of Orientalism.109 
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Figure C. Although difficult to read, this phylogeny shows the relationships between extinct and extant 
(still existing) religions of the world on the vertical axis and a timescale from 18,000 BCE to 2000 CE on 
the horizontal axis.  This phylogeny portrays extant denominations of Christianity in red and orange (top 
19 lines), Islam in green (next 3 lines), Judaism in yellow (next line), Asian religions in blue (next 6 lines), 
and indigenous traditions in purple, pink, grey, and maroon (bottom 12 lines).110, 111 
 
Religions studied by anthropology generally garnered the title ‘primitive’ or ‘savage’ in 
reference to their perceived lack of Western sophistication and rationale, keeping in mind that 
this comparative religion study was meant to define the West through the relative characteristics 
of the other society.  While anthropology was used to examine small, non-Christian religions, 
political science, sociology, and economics 
 
became viable and effective ways of understanding European society because this 
society had finally reached maturity, that is, had sufficiently developed in 
accordance with rational principles and established itself on the basis of the rule 
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of law, instead of on some real or imagined supernatural authority.  In contrast, 
every region of the nonmodern non-West was presumed to be thoroughly in the 
grip of religion, as all aspect of life were supposedly determined and dictated by 
an archaic metaphysics of the magical and the supernatural.  In the case of 
preliterate tribal society, it was assumed that the dominant metaphysics would be 
a form of natural religion, that is, a moral universe saturated by supernatural and 
autochthonous powers, a cosmology deeply ingrained in the landscape, the cycle 
of seasons, and the natural rhythms of life.  As we know, this type of assumption 
concerning tribal-scale society induced many anthropologists of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries to concentrate their attention on what they were 
inclined to identify as ‘religion’, in order to find therein some obscure logic or 
arcane ‘prelogical’ system of thought presumably governing all aspects of tribal 
life.112 
 
This popular style of imagining the world “laid grounds for academic legitimization of the 
pluralist discourse of world religions.”113  Early 20th century religion scholar Stanley Cook 
states, “Indeed the whole history of religion reveals a continuous process of change in the 
world’s religions whether in the more primitive or in the more advanced stages,” making the 
position of linear progression from primitive to advanced so clear you’d have to wear a blindfold 
not to see it.114  John Arnott MacCulloch, another religion scholar from the very early 1900s, 
“blithely opines that ‘the aspects of savage religion do not vary greatly wherever it is found,’ and 
on that ground, he suggests, a general treatment of them as a type would ‘ensure better 
acquaintance with religion at a low level than a separate account of each savage race would 
do.’”115  Cook and MacCulloch summarily demonstrate the general attitudes of the time period 
held by scholars, anthropologists, and any who saw cultural Darwinism as a way to place 
themselves within the framework of a newly globalized society. 
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The Symposium: 
All the factors that created the comparative religion movement are evident in the 1930 
symposium.  These elements are not explicitly stated by the symposium speakers.  Rather, they 
are the strong, deadly undercurrents that direct the flow of thought.  The themes of scientific 
superiority, goal-oriented evolution, eugenics, attitudes about non-Christian religions, and 
subjective truth will be used to show how a hierarchical paradigm that prioritized Western 
culture over others was in play. 
 
Greek Rationality 
One fallacious theme of the symposium was the assertion that scientific knowledge 
indicates an inherently better human existence.  In an attempt to emulate their classical Greek 
heroes of logic, these “socially militant scientists” tended to use “scientific rationalism as the key 
to social reform.”116  Professor Julian Huxley demonstrates this tactic with the assertion that 
“what science can and should do is to modify the form of religion.  It is the duty of religion to 
accept and assimilate scientific knowledge...If religion refuses to do so she will lose influence 
and adherents.”117  He argues that scientific technologies are the “only means by which man can 
go on increasing his power over nature and over the destiny of his race.”118   When it comes to 
the relationship between religion and science, he characterizes it as commensalistic.  In the 
biological field, commensalism describes a relationship between two organisms in which one 
benefits and the other is unaffected.  To be clear, he makes the distinction that 
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I do not mean that science should dictate to religion how it should change or 
what form it should take.  I mean that it is the business and the duty of the 
various religions to accept the new knowledge we owe to science, to assimilate it 
into their systems, and to adjust their general ideas and outlook accordingly.119 
 
In this model, religion receives the benefit of scientific truth but science remains unchanged by 
religion.  He rationalizes this view by explaining how “scientific discoveries have entirely altered 
our general picture of the universe and of man’s position in it.”120  Taking his logic a step further, 
it becomes clear that any communities or cultures that did not accept scientific knowledge could 
be categorized as less-than communities that did.  Dr. L. P. Jacks maintains that “no one who 
willfully neglects the teachings of science can live the good life.”121  He associates science with 
the good life, therefore societies that do not have science must necessarily not lead the good life.  
Societies without technology would have been, at the time, mainly non-Christian.  Moreover, 
Huxley, who was the first Director General of UNESCO, did not believe that these non-Christian 
societies needed scientific education specifically because of their ethnicity and class.122  Using 
science to justify ordering societies from worst to best is just one of the many ways these 
speakers rationalized racism. 
 
Divinely Inspired Evolution 
One of the weightiest reasons why using Darwinism to describe humanity is a mistake is 
the fact that Darwin’s theory did not include a goal.  Evolution by natural selection does not 
claim that any one species is more advanced than another; it does not even claim that species 
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alive today are necessarily better than those that were alive millions of years ago and have since 
gone extinct.  Cultural Darwinists, on the other hand, firmly believed that evolution was goal-
driven.  This myth of human progress – the idea that humanity inevitably moves in a positive 
direction – was used to justify racist hierarchies under European hegemony.  This view of 
evolution indicated that there was a divine purpose associated with evolution, a godly ideal 
towards which humanity was moving.123  Canon B. H. Streeter represents this Modernist 
understanding of the “human race as the supreme expression of God’s will on earth.”  Professor 
S. Alexander professed in his 1920 book, Space, Time, and Deity, that the revelation of God 
would indicate that evolution had reached its final stage.124  Professor Sir J. Arthur Thomson 
maintains that 
 
our new world excels that of our forefathers in its grandeur, its orderliness, its 
beauty, its revelation of advance or progress...Here we partly mean that, just as we 
have become accustomed scientifically to see Man in the light of evolution, so 
philosophically we must try to see evolution in the light of Man.125   
 
Thomson’s way of merging his scientific and religious viewpoints was to use evolution as an 
alternative creation narrative: “The religious doctrine of creation implies the belief that the 
institution of the Order of Nature expressed a Divine Purpose or Idea; it is not inconsistent with 
this to hold also to the scientific view that the mode of the Becoming has been evolutionary.”126 
Believing that evolution is a divine process is not inherently evil; the conflict arises when 
Thomson describes the modern culture as more advanced than that of our forefathers or when 
Streeter and Alexander turn a purportedly secular scientific theory into a Christian doctrine.  This 
description implies a ranking of societies by quality, which is ethically problematic and leads to 
                                               
123 Bowler, p. 130 
124 Ibid., p. 74 
125 Huxley et al., p. 31-32 
126 Ibid., p. 29 
 33 
racist ideologies.  Appropriating science, which itself claims to be unbiased and universally 
applicable, as Christian dogma excludes non-Christian communities from various forms of 
empirical knowledge and any benefits derived from new technologies.127 
 
Eugenics 
A result of viewing humanity as part of a goal-oriented evolution was the scientific 
discipline of eugenics.  The Right Rev. Barnes, Bishop of Birmingham, inspired to help 
humanity achieve the ideal towards which he believed it to be inevitably moving, advocated for 
applied eugenics, or “selective breeding for humanity.” 128  The Modernists, bolstered by the 
“hope of human progress” saw it as their “Christian duty to further the spiritual progress of the 
race, and if this meant following a eugenic policy to weed of the genetically unfit, so be it.”129  
Huxley, particularly well known for his research in eugenics, “remained convinced throughout 
his life that evolution was progressive and that the human race represented its most important 
outcome.” 130, 131  He proclaims that “human mental powers now allowed us to take charge of the 
evolutionary process, thus endowing us with immense responsibility.”132  This assumption of 
reasonability begs the question, “The responsibility to do what?”  In the case of these symposium 
men, the answer is the responsibility to ensure the progress of the human race in the right 
direction.  The Very Rev W. R. Inge sums up this problematic view of evolution as the “ascent 
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of man from lower forms.”133  He was convinced that the “white races” were “doomed” to failure 
and obliteration “unless they could prevent the proliferation of the unfit.”134  He, like Barnes, 
thought that “to purify the race in this way [through eugenics] was a Christian duty.”135  Roughly 
translated from its Greek root words, the term ‘eugenics’ means ‘true-born’ or ‘well-born.’136  
This specific science is devoted to identifying and reproducing desirable traits in human 
populations; a similar practice, artificial selection, is used in agriculture, animal farming, and 
breeding domesticated animals such as dogs and horses.  More than with artificial, eugenics 
incurs some serious ethical barriers.137  The most prominent example of the dark side of eugenics 
is the Holocaust; the Nazis demonstrated how a subjective truth about desired characteristics had 
far reaching and very real consequences for literally millions of people.  This dark side of 
eugenics is not taken so far (as in, they did not actually murder a whole bunch of people) by the 
symposium speakers, but the threat of prioritizing particular groups of people over others 
remains present.  Moreover, because Darwin’s theory of evolution does not presuppose a 
purpose or end-goal, the application of Darwinism in eugenics as proposed by these men is 
logically flawed.  Evolution does not move in a particular, guided direction – not according to 
purely scientific principles, anyway.  Therefore, to interpret evolution as goal-oriented is a sign 
of cultural Darwinism; to take on the mantle of the purification of the human race is a sign of 
arrogance and dubious morality. 
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Non-Christian Religions 
One of the surest signs of a cultural Darwinian perspective is disparaging commentary 
about non-Christian religions.  Combining the scientific superiority complex with goal-driven 
evolution creates a dichotomy between Western culture and the rest of the world.  Throughout 
this discussion, buzzwords like primitive and savage illustrate the condescending attitude the 
symposium speakers portrayed.  When Professor B. Malinowski, for example, describes non-
Christian religions, he uses terms such as “primitive”, “savage”/ “mere savages”, “superstitious”, 
and “heathendom.”138  Barnes concurrently mentions “fundamentalists and magic-mongers,” 
which, given the historical context, likely refer respectively to Muslims and small society, non-
Christian religions.139   
Generally, referring to non-Christian religious traditions as having to do with magic or 
superstition is a sign that these cultures were viewed as non-rational and therefore less 
sophisticated than scientific, Christian, Western cultures.  In everyday parlance, “the more 
‘traditional’ the society, the greater the role religion plays within it – or so we presume, 
regardless of how much or how little we happen to know about the society in question or about 
its supposed tradition.”140  The assumption here is that if a society is seemingly more concerned 
with religion, then they must be less concerned with science, they therefore must have a less 
nuanced view of the world, and hence should not be taken seriously.  Further, these cultures are 
usually categorized as bad while Christianity alone receives the categorization good.  This 
Modernist position which imagined magic in opposition to religion, or merely as a precursor to 
‘true’ religion, derived from a  
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denial of the supernatural, allow[ing] humanity to portray itself in a new light – 
no longer a sinful race facing judgment, but the agent of God’s power on earth, 
with the ability to push spiritual progress forward by its own efforts.  Christ 
became the perfect human, a model for what we may all become in the future if 
we follow his teachings, not a supernatural agent with miraculous powers.141 
 
This rationale demonstrates the unspoken desire to use logical thought to distance Western 
culture from traditions that subscribed to a paradigm involving a miraculous deity, namely the 
Jewish and Islamic traditions, as discussed earlier.  Streeter displays this attitude saying, “What 
man wants to do is largely a matter of whether or no he has a religion, and whether that religion 
is a good one or a bad.”142  He describes how some of his contemporaries would argue that 
“among savage peoples religion is often an advantage, even though connected with superstitious 
beliefs and with practices repellent to civilised man.”  He qualifies this statement by remarking 
that “no religion which rests on superstition can aspire to guide mankind in the right direction at 
this crucial stage in the history of human progress.”143  Alexander illustrates the imaginary 
phylogeny created by cultural Darwinism.  He suggests that religion may have arisen from 
magic, and might still be somewhat intertwined: “Hence the barbarity and childishness that may 
disfigure the practice of religious rites; and its confusion with magic, from which it may not 
wholly yet have risen free.”144  The most obvious sign yet of cultural Darwinism is the 
prioritization of Christianity over other religious traditions.  Huxley explicates this prioritization 
as he describes a “development in religion” from traditions that are “primitive and 
crude...degenerate...cruel or unenlightened” to those that are “advanced and 
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elaborate...progressive...noble and beautiful.” 145  This extremely colored judgment leaves no 
room for doubt about his cultural Darwinism. 
Thinking about religion and the ‘evolution’ of religion as originating from a superstitious, 
magic-practicing society is rather Freudian.  H. R. L. Sheppard, the Dean of Canterbury, 
comments, “Scientific truth has indeed set men free...from the haunting tyranny of ancient fears 
and superstitions.”146  Freud theorizes in his treatise, The Future of an Illusion, about how 
religion must have originated due to humanity’s fear of that which cannot be explained, the fear 
of the unknown.147  Consider natural phenomena like thunder and lightning: in the past, Freud 
argues, these must have seemed like manifestations of an angry god.  In rational modernity, the 
terrifying unknown becomes understandable and the need for a supernatural explanation 
disappears.148  Freud’s theories about religion were comparativist and reflected an evolutionary 
view of humankind.  This warped view of evolution, in this case, is being used by the 
symposium speakers to back up the idea that God’s Divine plan involves inevitable human 
progress away from magical, superstitious societies.149   
Considering magic and religion on a similar playing field flew in the face of the Western-
dominated paradigm that the symposium speakers promoted.  Some well-known religion 
scholars, such as Emile Durkheim, whose theories are studied in academia to this day, advocate 
for the intellectual separation of religion and magic.150  However, a significant discussion has 
since emerged in the modern discourse of religion scholarship that strongly opposes this archaic 
standpoint and considers magic to be a valid form of religious practice.  Stolow, for instance, 
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writes about “technologies of enchantment” which are “strategies used by human beings to exert 
control over the thoughts and actions of other human beings.”151  Such technologies could 
include church rituals – which Barnes, for one, vehemently opposed – or political rhetoric or 
scientific theories or magical practices.  Stolow describes the “performance of modern techno-
science” as resembling a “system of magical or religious action.”152  These performances work to 
achieve similar goals through apparently different paths.  His purposeful choice in displaying the 
interchangeability of magic and religion portrays the modern sentiment which the symposium 
speakers do not share.  For them, the issue with considering magic and religion on a similar 
plane is that the universe would turn into a “cosmos that far more resembles the one perceived 
‘primitively’ as a relatively undifferentiated order of humans, gods, animals and the diverse 
forms of equipment that tie them together.”153  This undifferentiated order would not be useful to 
the early 20th century folk who were trying to establish a European identity based on unbalanced 
power structures.   
 
Subjective Truth  
This whole discussion boils down to subjective truth.  Professor Sir Arthur S. Eddington 
illustrates the importance of truth itself when he says, “If we go right back to the beginning [of 
the universe] the first thing we must recognise in the world is something intent on truth – 
something to which it matters intensely that belief should be true.”154  The symposium speakers 
revealed their attitude of cultural superiority in their discussion of truth.  The claim that a 
subjective truth should be accepted as the one and only absolute truth by all immediately implies 
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an underlying superiority complex.  Professor J. S. Haldane speaks about God as the “Personality 
of personalities” and professes the opinion that “revelation of God” comes only through 
exploration “within ourselves, in our active ideals of truth, right, charity, and beauty, and 
consequent fellowship with others.”155  These markers that he uses to describe his experience of 
God – right and beauty, for example – are presented in a manner that suggests he believes that 
these concepts can be objectively true in a world far too complicated for that possibility.  The 
Rev C. W. O’Hara echoes this sentiment when he says that religion “teaches with certainty the 
vital truths concerning man’s development in this world in order that he may reach a final state 
of perfection.”156  Malinowski connects the veracity of the “religious truth” of Christianity to the 
ethically incorrect attitude about other religious traditions. 157  He cautions the, “I do not want 
you to forget all that is crude, cruel, and degraded in the religions of the savages.”158  Barnes 
drives home this fallacy of truth with the idea of “true religion,” by default implying that he 
believes that religions have the ability to be declared to be false and that he thinks he has the 
authority to do so.159  This arrogance of cultural superiority is at the heart of cultural Darwinism.  
Only with this flawed foundation does the house of cards that cultural Darwinists built into the 
science of comparative religions make the slightest bit of sense.    
 
Conclusion 
 Believing subjective truths to be absolute convinced ‘experts’ of the early 20th century 
thought they could take Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection and apply it to human 
cultures; they did this in a way that reinforced a racist, Western hegemony that solidified their 
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cultural identity in a politically and existentially shaky world.  Understanding the historical and 
social factors of early 20th century Britain matters because a field of study, the science of 
comparative religions, was born from these ideas and continues to propagate racist ideologies 
today.  However, the science of comparative religion is not in fact a science at all.  An incredible 
amount of bias goes into this field and goes unacknowledged by its ‘scientists’.  The supremacy 
of broadcast radio practically ensured that this 19th and early 20th century message would reach 
clear into the present. 
 To recapitulate, in the 1930s, broadcast radio, was one of the relatively new mechanical 
inventions that kept Britain afloat during the Great Depression and subsequently developed a 
massive public influence.  Colonies were demanding autonomy, and the British government 
underwent remarkable internal changes while it dealt with various global tensions.  Regarding 
radio, the social implications of its status as a broadcasting monopoly combined with the general 
awe and mystery surrounding the device itself allowed BBC Director General Reith to mold his 
new corporation into guiding moral light for the British people – at least, such was the intention.  
As a religious technology, broadcast radio provided a medium for the people to interact in new 
ways with the ideologies expressed in the 1930 symposium.  The effect of using the radio to 
disseminate this symposium was twofold: first, it indicates to modern researchers the general 
mood of the academics at the time due to radio’s capability to act as a sort of mirror to cultural 
norms, and second, it amplified the views of the symposium speakers back to the people and 
thereby altered the public culture.  The message that radio spread so widely was one of cultural 
Darwinism.  A crisis involving settling Europe’s position in the modern world determined what 
the field of comparative religion was to become.  The stain of colonialism, the desire to emulate 
the Enlightenment rationality embodied by the Ancient Greeks, and the new field of philology 
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rationalized a deep-rooted racism within the mindset of those wishing to use comparative 
religion as a way to understand the world. 
 Today in the United States, not much has changed.  We still face economic, political, and 
social turmoil.  We are still recovering from the Recession, and the national debt rises every day.  
Fear abounds on all sides – fear of the ‘other’ expressed through Islamophobia and anti-
Semitism; fear of autocratic, conservative, populist political figures like Donald Trump and 
Marine Le Pen; fear that a globalized society will change (or has already changed) the United 
States’ position as a leading world power.  The perceived animosity between religion and science 
continues, for instance, in the debates about the reality of climate change, and mass 
communication technologies like the internet and television reinforce polarizing political 
ideologies.160  It is the responsibility of scientists and religion scholars today to not allow these 
factors to create similar mistakes to the ones exemplified by the cultural Darwinists in early 20th 
century Britain. 
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